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I. Introduction
The last two years have seen a series of changes affecting regionalism in North-
east Asia. One category of changes has been the crises in the areas of economy 
and security. The fi rst crisis is the global fi nancial crisis that originated in the 
United States and that was triggered by the U.S. government’s decision to let 
the Wall Street fi rm of Lehman Brothers fail.1
The second crisis was North Korea’s second nuclear test. Korean Central News 
Agency, the North Korean regime’s offi cial mouthpiece, said: “We have suc-
cessfully conducted another nuclear test on 25 May as part of the republic’s 
measures to strengthen its nuclear deterrent.”2
Another category of changes are leadership changes in the region. The fi rst 
leadership change occurred in South Korea, and the change can be character-
ized as a more right wing government tilt. In contrast with South Korea is the 
power transition of the U.S. administration to a more reformist direction. Re-
cently we have seen a dramatic leadership change in the Japanese government 
through a revolutionary victory against the Liberal Democratic Party, a victory 
that led to the launch of the Yukio Hatoyama cabinet with a new policy direc-
tion symbolized by a new initiative for an East Asian community.
This paper analyzes the impacts of these changes on the direction of regional-
ism in the region. Section 2 summarizes a recent study of a regional integration 
index in order to achieve an actual picture of the past and the present of the re-
gion in terms of regional integration and comparing the Northeast Asian region 
with other major regional blocs. Section 3 introduces the models for explaining 
regionalism in general and Northeast Asian regionalism in particular. Section 
4 tries to apply the outcomes of the study and the models to the above changes 
in order to get at the implications for the future direction of regionalism in the 
region. Section 5 is in lieu of a conclusion.
II. The Past and the Present
Ahn and Park (2007) constructed a regional integration index (RII) and mea-
sured the level of regional integration of each regional community. 
1 Investors had expected a rescue. Just days before, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury had saved Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the investment bank Bear Stearns had 
also been bailed out six months earlier.
2 The KCNA announcement was reported by The Guardian (London) on 25 May 2009.
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Regional Integration Index
The RII (Table 1 on the next page) is defi ned as follows:
RII = functional integration index + sociocultural integration index + political 
security index + institutional integration index
The four sub-indices of RII—that is, functional integration index, sociocultural 
integration index, political security index, and institutional integration index—
are defi ned as functions of other factors as follows:
Functional integration index = F 
 (trade, direct investment, fi nancial trans actions)
Sociocultural integration index = F 
 (cultural homogeneity, maturity of civil society, level of information lit-
eracy)
Political security index = F 
 (homogeneity and maturity of politico-economic system, regional structure 
of political security dynamics, political leadership)
Institutional integration index = F 
 (cooperation in various fi elds, regional organizations and trade-related trea-
ties, fi nancial and monetary cooperation)
Three criteria were selected for each sub-index. Thus, 12 specifi c factors were 
evaluated. The functional integration index is calculated by gauging the shares 
of intraregional trade, intraregional foreign direct investment, and intraregional 
portfolio investment. These factors are important indices that show the degree 
of intramarket economic integration in terms of trade, investment, and capital 
transactions.
The sociocultural index measures cultural homogeneity (whether history, re-
ligion, language, or ethnicity is commonly shared), average maturity level of 
civil society, and the level of information literacy. Cultural homogeneity per-
ceived by citizens of member countries is a pivotal factor in regional integra-
tion. Moreover, when a civil society is established, regional integration may be 
advanced in terms of formal aspects such as law and institutions, when citizens 
actively participate in politics and nongovernmental organization activities, 
and when government operating according to law is established. Expanding 
information literacy enables free communication between individuals within 
the region and is therefore conducive to regional integration. Thus, information 
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literacy is used as an index to gauge the level of understanding among member 
countries.
The political security index is measured by homogeneity and maturity of the 
political-economic system, regional structure of political security dynam-
ics, and political leadership. Homogeneity and similar levels of maturity of 
political-economic systems may facilitate regional integration. Furthermore, 
the regional structure of political security dynamics is a catalyst for achiev-
ing regional integration. When common crises or threats exist, incumbent na-
tions pursue regional integration to address the common concern. The Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
were such cases. In contrast, factors such as historical or territorial disputes 
hamper regional integration. Regional competition for hegemony also hampers 
regional integration. Countries may strive for regional integration to eliminate 
the negative effects of such competition. The role of the United States, which 
commands the global political economic structure, may benefi t or hinder in-
tegration depending on the circumstances. In the case of the EU, the United 
States played a positive role in achieving regional integration.
The institutional integration index is calculated by advances in cooperation 
in various fi elds, the existence of regional organizations and treaties related 
to trade and investment, and fi nancial and monetary cooperation. Cooperation 
starts as a common enterprise in numerous fi elds such as political security, 
economy, society, and culture. It may then progress from a conference of mem-
ber countries’ offi cials to ministerial meetings and summits. Regional organi-
zations and treaties related to trade and investment refer to organizations estab-
lished to address common regional issues and offi cial treaties between nations, 
such as investment treaties and free trade agreements (FTAs). Financial and 
monetary cooperation are measures of the level of cooperation in fi nancial and 
monetary policies, such as exchange rate cooperation and common currency 
usage (see Table 2 for facilitators of integration as well as problem areas).
The research aimed to measure the 12 criteria to suggest the degree of integra-
tion in each regional community. Those criteria consist of both quantitative and 
qualitative data. Many of the 12 criteria were treated as qualitative because data 
were unattainable in many instances. Each category is scored on a scale of 1 to 
5, with a higher score meaning higher achievement.
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Comparison with Other Blocs and Implications
Northeast Asia has several facilitators in the aspect of socio-culture. The homo-
geneity of culture, the maturity of civil society, and the development of digi-
talization are the facilitators of regional integration. Functional integration, 
especially the shares of intraregional trade and intraregional foreign direct 
investment, are not low despite the fact that there is no formal regional integration 
body. The homogeneity and maturity of political economic systems are increasing 
steadily along with political leadership. A comparison of the situation of North-
east Asia in 2005 with initial conditions in other integrated bodies shows that 
Northeast Asia (with a ranking of 2.58) is more highly integrated than ASEAN 
(2.25), the EU (2.08), and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA, 2.58); 
and it is much better than MERCOSUR (1.83). However, when the development 
stage is compared, Northeast Asia (2.33) is a little bit lower than ASEAN (2.92), 
EU (2.84), and NAFTA (3.17), and it is almost the same as MERCOSUR (2.50).
Even though the political-security factor should play an active role for North-
east Asian regional integration, it seems that a longer time is required to en-
hance the homogeneity of the political-economic system among China, Japan, 
and Korea. Also the maturity of the Chinese political-economic system cannot 
be realized in the short run.
Table 2: Comparison of Integration Facilitators and Bottlenecks
Source: Ahn Hyung-do and Park Jehoon, A Politico-Economic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional 
Cooperation: Search for a New Model and Korea’s Strategies [in Korean], Policy Analyses no. 07-07 
(Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2007).
Notes: Scores on the Regional Integration Index of 3 points or more than 3 points in 2005 are 
classifi ed as facilitators. ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; EU = European Union; 
MERCOSUR = customs union in the Southern Cone of South America; NAFTA = North American 
Free Trade Area; NEA = Northeast Asia.
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Therefore, the most important factor for Northeast Asian regional integration 
is the political leadership and initiative of regional leaders for pursuing re-
gional integration on the basis of the recognition of necessity and signifi cance 
of Northeast Asian regional integration.
The degree of functional integration in Northeast Asia is low compared with 
the EU and NAFTA, but it is almost the same as that of the early EU or  ASEAN 
and MERCOSUR, which have already been forming FTAs. Therefore, the 
functional factor could work as a facilitator. How to develop the functional 
integration so that it matures to institutional integration will be a key factor.
III. Models for Regional Integration in Northeast Asia
Theories and Models in General
Historically there have been two models from which economic integration 
might proceed.3 The fi rst is a trade-oriented (or market-oriented) model, which 
is based on traditional regionalism or the European Economic Community 
(EEC) model. This model is also based on the neoclassical functional approach. 
The second model is an industry-oriented (or planning-oriented) model, which 
is based on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) model. The sec-
ond model is based on an institutional approach and emphasizes the role of 
institutions for economic integration together with the role of human will in 
institution building. Recently a third model has emerged. That is a fi nancial 
sector–oriented model, which is based on the new regionalism growing out of 
the East Asian crisis model.
In the fi eld of politics and security, there are two different approaches. The fi rst 
is an ideological approach, where we may see the left, right, and center wings, 
or conservatism and radicalism. The second approach is the triad of construc-
tivism, liberalism, and realism based on the theories of international relations. 
Constructivism involves perspectives adopted from sociology. It is believed 
that the ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct, and re-
produce the institutional and material structures. Liberalism is a perspective 
adopted from economics. Liberals assign greater importance to international 
institutions as a basis for sustaining cooperative state behavior and mitigating 
the effects of anarchy. Finally, realism maintains a traditional perspective of 
political science, especially the centrality and objective character of the mate-
rial distribution of capabilities (Katzenstein and Sil 2004, 8–19).
3 This section is based on a revision of Park, Pempel, and Roland (2008, chap. 10).
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In a comprehensive effort to combine all three approaches, one could call for 
an interdisciplinary summary of regional integration theories. In Figure 1, the 
top angle depicts political sociology or socio-political science, especially con-
structivism. The angle on the lower right depicts social economics, especially 
the Weberian approach (Max Weber). The angle on the lower left depicts politi-
cal economy (Marxism) or political economics (liberalism). Realism belongs 
to the traditional realm of political science. In the traditional category of eco-
nomics, the ECSC model and the EEC model explain the typical integration 
through economic processes.
Academic legacies can be traced to two great thoughts of capitalism: One is 
Marxism, especially historical materialism or economic determinism. The 
other is the ideas of Max Weber. Weber’s main question is “Why did only the 
West develop capitalist systems?” He explains this by citing Protestantism, 
which in turn is rooted in the philosophy that the superstructure determines the 
economy.
Figure 2 shows a Marxian model for regional integration based on the interdis-
ciplinary summary. This is a long-term model for economic integration where 
Figure 1: Interdisciplinary Summary of Regional Integration Theories
Source: Ahn Hyung-do and Park Jehoon, A Politico-Economic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional 
Cooperation: Search for a New Model and Korea’s Strategies [in Korean], Policy Analyses no. 07-07 
(Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2007), 100.
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markets directly infl uence state, society, and institutions, although the state and 
the society also exert weak infl uence over institutions. The market is consid-
ered to be the strongest force and player in the model. It takes a rather long 
time for institutions to emerge, which is consistent with the arguments of the 
evolutionary view in the “new institutional economics.” This model explains 
relatively well the EEC model and the EU model since 1970s.
Figure 3 shows a Weberian model for regional integration based on the inter-
disciplinary summary. This is a short-term model for security cooperation, 
where the state directly infl uences offi cial institutions. In this regard, political 
leadership or humans will play a critical role in building offi cial institutions. 
This model explains relatively well the early EU model, ECSC model, or the 
fi nancial sector–oriented model.
Figure 2 could be said to be a natural fl ow model. In this case, competition 
induces cooperation, and then cooperation again induces integration or insti-
tutionalization. This further explains traditional economic cooperation. Figure 
Source: Author’s concept.
Note: Bold arrows depict strong and direct infl uences and relationships, while dotted arrows depict 
weak and indirect infl uences and relationships. State, society and market are three fi elds and players 
in regional integration.
Figure 2: Marxian Model for Regional Integration
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3 could be called a reverse-fl ow model, where competition or confl ict induces 
crisis, and then crisis induces cooperation or institutions. This explains secu-
rity cooperation or fi nancial regionalism. The reality, however, is that only the 
combination of these two models allows us to understand the complexities un-
der which regionalism is moving forward.
Possible Models of Regional Integration in Northeast Asia
Generally speaking, the Weberian model is more applicable to Northeast Asia 
because of the need to formulate driving forces for the institutionalization of 
regional integration in Northeast Asia, given the fact that the level of functional 
integration is not low when it is compared with the level of EU cooperation in 
the early period of integration. However, the Weberian model alone is not suf-
fi cient to establish a unique model for regional integration in Northeast Asia. 
Based on the above discussion, we may consider the following set of possible 
models for Northeast Asia in the state sector.4
Strong state. In Northeast Asia there has been a long tradition of a strong state 
and a developmental state. Such a tradition has created political and economic 
institutions to guarantee state intervention. This implies that in Northeast Asia 
Figure 3: Weberian Model for Regional Integration
Source: Author’s concept.
Note: Bold arrows depict strong and direct infl uences and relationships; dotted arrows depict weak 
and indirect infl uences and relationships. State, society, and market are three fi elds and players in 
regional integration.
4 In addition to the state, we could set up models for the society and the market sector; see Chapter 
10 of Park, Pempel, and Roland (2008).
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“the state still matters in economic development—how it matters has changed 
considerably” (Wong 2004, 357). In this context “regulatory regionalism” is 
suggested for Northeast Asia. It is different from the European model of re-
gional governance. The European model is accompanied by regional institution 
building with the objectives of sovereignty constraint or sovereignty pooling. 
Regulatory regionalism, however, pursues closer integration through common 
national regulation and policy coordination, which carry fewer negative con-
notations for sovereignty and regime autonomy (Higgott 2005, 35–36).
Crisis model. We may prefer and anticipate a natural fl ow model or a gradual 
model for regional integration in Northeast Asia. We should, however, consider 
and prepare for the possibilities of a big bang. The North Korean nuclear crisis 
could play a double role in regional integration. It is easy to understand that the 
current crisis is an evident barrier against regional integration. From a different 
angle, however, the crisis could be a catalyst for regional integration in that the 
procedure (the six-party talks) for resolving the current crisis could become 
the forum for reinforcing broader regional integration. The crisis model could 
be related to a reverse-fl ow model or Weberian model. We may also call this a 
reduced or compressed integration model.
Political leadership model. The crisis model could lead to an appreciation 
of how political leadership plays a critical role, considering the fact that state 
power is still stronger than market power and societal power in Northeast Asia, 
and strong political leadership is essential in order to resolve the current crises 
in the region. European experiences, especially those of Jean Monnet (1976), 
teach us that “genuine integration leadership” comes from the strong convic-
tion for uniting people as well as for ideologically unbiased and politically 
neutral leadership. Note, however, that Monnet’s political leadership model for 
institution building through sudden change is distinguished from the evolution-
ary arguments of the new institutional economics of D. North (1990).
IV. Applications to Recent Changes
Hatoyama (2009) pointed out the paradox: “I would suggest that the issues 
which stand in the way of regional integration can only really be resolved 
through the process of moving toward greater regional integration.” Han Sung-
joo (2009) stresses the relationship between crises and political leadership:
. . . Regional community is at once both the end-result of 
peace and reconciliation among its members and the facilita-
tor of future harmony among them. But a threshold has to be 
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crossed before a happy, mutually reinforcing process can be-
gin. Overcoming past grievances and present and future dis-
putes will take leadership and political will, which unfortunate-
ly are lacking in East Asia, and Northeast Asia in particular.
The above regional integration index approach confi rms that in Northeast Asia 
stronger political leadership is needed, considering the fact that the functional 
integration in the region is relatively mature. Also, crises could play a positive 
role or a stimulus for regional integration. Therefore, we need stronger political 
leadership and a certain degree of common crises. What kind of implications 
can we derive from applying to recent changes the results of the RII approach 
and the two models for regional integration in Northeast Asia?
Crises
According to the crisis model and contrary to conventional beliefs, crises could 
contribute to the enhancement of regional integration. With regard to Northeast 
Asian regionalism, two crises should be mentioned. One is the global fi nancial 
crisis, and the other is North Korea’s nuclear test.
Global fi nancial crisis. The fi nancial crisis started from the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As the fi rst organized global effort for 
resolving the crisis, a summit of the Group of Twenty (G-20) was held in Wash-
ington, D.C., on 15 November 2008. World leaders (Group of Twenty 2008) 
agreed on “the common principles for reform of fi nancial markets” such as 
strengthening transparency and accountability, enhancing sound regulation, 
promoting integrity in fi nancial markets, reinforcing international cooperation, 
and reforming international fi nancial institutions. Immediately afterward a re-
gional effort took place in Northeast Asia: the December 2008 trilateral Korea-
China-Japan summit.
This trilateral summit was held on 13 December in Fukuoka, Japan. Lee Myung-
bak, president of Korea; Taro Aso, prime minister of Japan; and Wen Jiabao, 
prime minister of China focused their talks on how their countries could help 
Asia—and the world—get out of the looming recession.
Since 1999, a trilateral summit has been successfully held almost every year. 
The December 2008 trilateral summit was exceptionally signifi cant in terms 
of its historic meaning and timing. First, this was the fi rst trilateral summit to 
be held independently from other multilateral occasions. Prior to this summit, 
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all eight rounds of the trilateral summit had taken place in Southeast Asia, 
at the annual ASEAN Plus Three summit; that is, cooperation among Korea, 
China, and Japan had been discussed as part of cooperation within the ASEAN 
 framework.5
Since 2004, South Korea has persistently claimed the need to hold separate 
trilateral summits regularly. Meanwhile, numerous obstacles such as historic 
disputes stood in the way of doing so. The global fi nancial crisis became a 
stimulus for realizing this initiative. Korea’s proposal to hold the Korea-China-
Japan fi nancial summit to address the global fi nancial challenges was timely, 
indeed. As the three countries hold almost half of the world’s foreign currency 
reserves, trilateral cooperation in the fi nance sector especially will help not 
only East Asia but the rest of the world as well. In this sense, it was expected 
that trilateral cooperation could promote prosperity and stability in not only 
East Asia but the world as a whole.
The three countries issued a “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership,” which 
sets forth the direction and basic principles for trilateral cooperation in the 
years to come. In particular, the three leaders noted the importance of the Ko-
rea-China-Japan summit and specifi ed in the joint statement that it would be 
held regularly in one of the three countries. In addition, the three leaders en-
dorsed an action plan for promoting trilateral cooperation, in which they agreed 
to launch a Trilateral Cooperation Cyber-Secretariat in 2009 to deal with secre-
tariat affairs of trilateral meetings and consultations.
More important, the Korea Times on 14 December 2008 reported that the three 
leaders concurred on the necessity for tripartite cooperation in effi ciently deal-
ing with the global fi nancial situation. They made a commitment to implement 
the declaration of the summit on fi nancial markets and the world economy, 
including the action plan to implement principles for reform. They also agreed 
to work with ASEAN members to expedite the process of multilateralization as 
part of the Chiang Mai Initiative. Korea may be the most immediate benefi ciary 
of the tripartite summit meeting, which endorsed Seoul’s currency-swap deals 
with Tokyo and Beijing, totaling $60 billion. Prime Minister Aso’s proposal to 
expand the $80 billion swap fund, if realized, would open the door wider for 
Asian economic cooperation.
5 These three countries account for one-fourth of the world’s population and for one-fi fth of the 
world’s economy, with Japan ranking second, China fourth, and Korea thirteenth in terms of GDP in 
2007. Some economic forecasts indicate that the three economies may even account for one-third of 
the global economy in the next two decades.
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On 10 October 2009 the three leaders met again in Beijing for the second tri-
lateral summit not connected with ASEAN. Korea’s Blue House (Chong Wa 
Dae) reported on its Web site that they adopted a joint statement on sustainable 
development in order to pursue balanced development in the economy and the 
environment together. They also agreed on several projects: opening a Korea-
China-Japan cooperative cyber offi ce to coordinate a future conference sched-
ule and other duties; expanding youth exchanges in colleges and fi elds of art as 
well as in other sectors; launching the fi rst-ever Korea-China-Japan business 
summit in Beijing for businesspeople of all three nations to come together and 
discuss trade and investment; strengthening cooperation in the aviation sector, 
addressing issues like air traffi c control and implementation of next-generation 
air navigation systems; and establishing a ministerial level cooperative body 
for management of water resources.
Since 1999, the three countries have achieved the adoption of the Joint Dec-
laration on Korea-China-Japan Cooperation in 2003, the Action Strategy in 
2004, and the Action Plan in 2008. These early agreements laid the ground-
work for Korea, China, and Japan to present the basic principles and direction 
for trilateral cooperation (Yu 2009).
According to the Korea Times of 7 October 2009, the total amount of trade 
among the three countries quadrupled during the past decade from approxi-
mately $130 billion to $520 billion in 2008, while exchanges among people 
from the three countries doubled from 6.6 million to 14.3 million. Between 
1999 and 2008 the sum of the GDP of the three countries doubled, to account 
for one-sixth of the world’s total, while the sum of foreign exchange reserves 
has increased sixfold, representing half of the world’s total.
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan of South Korea expected that the summit 
would also represent a signifi cant opportunity to newly assert the willingness 
for cooperation among the three countries, in particular as the new Japanese 
government was emphasizing “Asia First” (Yu 2009).
A road map for the creation of an East Asian community has not yet been 
achieved. Nonetheless, it is believed that the summit was an important stage 
that demonstrated the role of the three nations in contributing to peace and 
prosperity not only in the region but elsewhere in the world. Therefore, it could 
be said that the global fi nancial crisis also contributed indirectly to Northeast 
6 G-20 leaders agreed that South Korea would be the venue for the November 2010 G-20 summit.
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Asian regionalism by increasing the roles of the three countries, especially in 
the platform of the G-20 as it replaced the Group of Eight. The voice of China 
increased notably at the G-20. South Korea could also enjoy the position of a 
middle power.6
North Korea’s nuclear test. On 9 October 2006 North Korea conducted its 
fi rst nuclear test. Less than three years later, on 25 May 2009, North Korea 
risked further international isolation after it claimed to have successfully tested 
a nuclear weapon as powerful as the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. 
The test came less than two months after the North enraged the United States 
and its allies by test-fi ring a long-range ballistic missile. Recently the South 
Korean government announced a “Grand Bargain” policy for North Korea’s 
nuclear issue, which has gained support from other countries in the six-party 
talks. The nuclear crisis has been a stimulus for making countries of the region 
gather and cooperate together.
Leadership Changes
There have been some time lags in leadership changes in Northeast Asia. South 
Korea was the fi rst one, contrasting with the United States and Japan in terms 
of the direction of change from the left toward the right.
South Korea. Choi (2009) argues that the administration of President Roh 
Moo-hyun appeared to have expected that China would elevate South Korea to 
the position of a balancer in Northeast Asia. As they observed China’s attempt 
to incorporate a part of ancient Korea’s history into its own, however, South 
Koreans came to realize that China was no different from other ascending pow-
ers: mindful of wielding its newly gained power for its own national interests 
(Snyder 2009, 95–96).
On 25 February 2008, during his inaugural address, President Lee Myung-bak 
declared that Korea is now on the “path to an advanced nation.” To achieve this 
task, he called on the nation to move beyond the “age of ideology” and to enter 
the “age of pragmatism,” with practical wisdom charting the course through 
the tides of globalization. He also said he would seek to strengthen ties with 
the United States and other major allies. He vowed to help North Korea if the 
communist country abandons its nuclear weapons.7
If the Roh administration focused on a Northeast Asia tilted toward China, 
the Lee Myung-bak government is emphasizing the U.S.-ROK alliance ex-
7 See the Korea Herald, 26 February 2009.
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panding the economic cooperation toward East Asia by declaring a “New Asia 
 Initiative.”
When he visited Jakarta, Indonesia, on 8 May 2009, President Lee announced 
the establishment of a New Asia Initiative. Under the initiative, Korea will play 
a central role in representing the interest of Asian nations in the internation-
al arena. The program also envisages Korea concluding FTAs with all Asian 
countries and establishing a green growth belt in the Asian-Pacifi c region. If 
realized, President Lee’s diplomatic initiative will boost Korea’s status and role 
in the Southeast Asian and South Pacifi c regions also. President Lee stressed 
the diplomacy of attaching importance to Asian nations based on Korea’s di-
plomacy toward its four major neighboring countries: the United States, China, 
Japan, and Russia.
United States. The global fi nancial crisis contributed to the leadership change 
in the United States. In his inaugural address on 20 January 2009, President 
Barack Obama mentioned some points that are relevant to the topic of this 
paper. Regarding the nuclear issue, Obama stressed: “With old friends and for-
mer foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the 
specter of a warming planet.” He also declared the necessity for change, saying 
that “the world has changed, and we must change with it.” And yet he empha-
sized the responsibility of the United States. “What is required of us now is a 
new era of responsibility—a recognition, on the part of every American, that 
we have duties to ourselves, our nation and the world, duties that we do not 
grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, fi rm in the knowledge that there is 
nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defi ning of our character, than giving our 
all to a diffi cult task.”
Pempel (2008, 576) criticizes the Bush administration in its approaches to for-
eign policy and to Asia, saying that it “differed considerably from prior admin-
istrations in the depth of its partisanship. . . . At the same time, . . . there is every 
reason to hope that a new Obama administration will actually begin to roll back 
some of the most negative policies of the past eight years.”
President Lee and President Obama held their fi rst mini summit on 2 April 2009 
in London. The offi cial Web site of Korea’s Blue House reported that President 
Obama stressed that the Korea-U.S. alliance and the countries’ friendship have 
continuously strengthened and that the alliance would be strengthened even 
more for the duration of his presidency. The leaders said they would seek both 
pressure and dialogue in dealing with North Korea through the six-party talks 
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and the UN Security Council. President Obama said he understood Lee’s efforts 
for the Korea-U.S. FTA and added that he also had a strong will to advance the 
FTA talks. President Lee said that the so-called KORUS FTA is signifi cant not 
only economically but also in terms of the bilateral alliance.
Japan. Last September, the people of Japan voted for a big change, not simply 
of a party but a whole system (Economist 2009). Japan’s leadership change has 
a direct implication for Northeast Asian regionalism. Prime Minister Hatoyama 
(2009) distinguished his own government from his predecessors’ in declaring 
his foreign policy thrust will move from the U.S. alliance to a pro-Asian-neigh-
bors policy, most symbolically the creation of an East Asian community:
Another national goal that emerges from the concept of fra-
ternity is the creation of an East Asian community. Of course, 
Japan-U.S. Security Pact will continue to be the cornerstone 
of Japanese diplomatic policy. Unquestionably, the Japan-U.S. 
relationship is an important pillar of our diplomacy. However, 
at the same time, we must not forget our identity as a nation 
located in Asia. I believe that the East Asian region, which is 
showing increasing vitality in its economic growth and even 
closer mutual ties, must be recognized as Japan’s basic sphere 
of being.
Hatoyama (2009) went further, suggesting his own solution for the global fi -
nancial crisis:
Our response to the recent global fi nancial crisis should not be 
simply to provide the kind of limited support measures previ-
ously employed by the IMF and the World Bank. Rather, we 
should be working toward a possible idea of the future com-
mon Asian currency. Establishing a common Asian currency 
will likely take more than 10 years. For such a single currency 
to bring about political integration will surely take longer still. 
Due to the seriousness of the ongoing global economic crisis, 
some people may wonder why I am taking the time to discuss 
this seemingly extraneous topic. However, I believe that the 
more chaotic, unclear and uncertain the problems we face, the 
higher and greater are the goals to which politicians should 
lead the people.
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V. Future Directions and Concluding Remarks
U.S. Role
Han (2009) raises a signifi cant question as to the role of the United States to-
ward East Asian regionalism: “The United States, although neither a member 
of ASEAN Plus Three nor the EAS, and perhaps because it isn’t, used to have 
more misgivings than blessings toward an East Asian grouping.” Regarding the 
recent position of United States, Han states, “rather than expressing opposition, 
it has decided to do something about it—like working in FTAs with such coun-
tries as Singapore and South Korea.”
Han (2009) was correct when he pointed out that “the fact that the United States 
is linked to East Asia through APEC should be a good reason to welcome the 
emergence of an East Asian community, not a ground to have misgivings.”
South Korea’s Role
Choi (2009) stresses a middle-power policy of South Korea: “On the part of 
the U.S. government, South Korea is a key component of its East Asian policy. 
In fact, the lack of U.S. interests in regional initiatives led to the decline of its 
infl uence in East Asia.” Therefore “the U.S. needs to fi nd a regional institu-
tional structure to complement its bilateral alliance system. The rising China 
requires sustained and constructive engagement of the United States, and Chi-
na feels more comfortable in a regional than a bilateral setting with the United 
States. In this connection KORUS FTA must be ratifi ed at the earliest possible 
 moment.”
Note that South Korea’s role should be a mediator or a coordinator rather than 
a balancer, stressing universal values like human rights, environment, democ-
racy, and market economy as essential multilateral norms for the region. One 
problem is the lack of clarity about what kind of East Asia South Korea envi-
sions in its regional schemes.
Northeast Asian Way8
The “ASEAN way,” which stresses informal, sovereignty-based, consensus-
oriented decision-making (Khong and Nesadurai 2007, 32–39), is standing in 
the way of building a genuinely institutionalized East Asia.
8 This section is a revised version of pp.163-164, Chapter 10 of Park, Pempel, and Roland(2008).
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Moreover, the lack of effective implementation made defection and cheating 
costless (Khong & Nesadurai 2007, 69). Regional institutions like ASEAN and 
ARF have largely remained a “talk-shop” without meaningful accomplish-
ments. This ASEAN way is presiding over not just Southeast Asia but also the 
Asia-Pacifi c region as well as Northeast Asia (Choi 2009). Therefore we need, 
so to speak, a new “Northeast Asian way.”
In the case of the EU, the six countries of the ECSC became the core. Since 
then other countries from western Europe have become members of the EU, 
and now almost all of the transition countries of eastern Europe are expected to 
join. We also may say that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (CSCE, established in 1975) or the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE, 1994) played the role of thresholds for institutional 
integration in Europe. In Northeast Asia, a Korea-Japan FTA or a Korea-China 
FTA could be the core of such economic integration. After this would happen, 
China or Japan might well desire to join the integration process. The six-party 
talks should be developed into, for instance, a “Conference on Security Coop-
eration in Northeast Asia (CSCNA),” which would be a Northeast Asian ver-
sion of CSCE or OSCE. A Korea-U.S. FTA could be a catalyst for economic 
integration in Northeast Asia.
At least in the security aspect, the crucial role of the United States is inevitable. 
To effectively manage a rising China, the United States should change its ex-
isting policies toward Northeast Asia to become more active as a participant 
or at least to accept regionalism in Northeast Asia. Active involvement by the 
United States in Asian regional integration is essential. Otherwise the United 
States should encourage and embrace the region’s emerging integration as part 
of its own new grand world design. Hence, instead of the “ASEAN way,” a 
Northeast Asian way: that is, a Korea-Japan core (or Korea-China core) plus a 
CSCNA threshold plus a U.S. catalyst approach.
Dichotomy
Morrison (2009) suggested three different conceptions of the region with regard 
to assessing the U.S. role—an East Asian region, a trans-Pacifi c or Asia-Pacifi c 
region congruent with the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC), and 
a North Pacifi c region. According to Morrison, “the North Pacifi c has hardly 
any identity as an international region. The one existing multilateral intergov-
ernmental process is the Six Party Talks.” He added that “there have also been 
proposals for G-2s and G-3s of North Pacifi c countries, but for the purpose of 
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promoting bilateral or trilateral cooperation, and not with the purpose of devel-
oping a sense of North Pacifi c cooperation as a whole.”
Han (2009) raises a question of how and to what extent the United States can 
and should be engaged in the East Asian regionalism movement.
Considering all of those factors related to regionalism in Northeast Asia in par-
ticular, or East Asia in general, I would like to suggest fi rst that we need to rec-
ognize a dichotomy between economy and security. Economically, the United 
States should allow a coalition or a bloc among East Asian countries. APEC is 
suffi cient for U.S. engagement in East Asian economic affairs. Regarding secu-
rity issues, however, the United States should actively participate, particularly 
in Northeast Asia through, for example, the framework of the six-party talks. 
Without the United States any security arrangement cannot be feasible in the 
region.
A New Concept of Community 
Japan and Indonesia are arguing for the concept of an expanded East Asia 
Community (with a capital C, which means an expanded large community of 
the total of 16 member countries). This would lead to an East Asia summit 
including more member countries like India, Australia, and New Zealand. Chi-
na prefers an enhanced form of ASEAN Plus Three (community with a small 
c, which means a small community of the original 13 member countries of 
ASEAN Plus Three), which would work as an independent regional bloc. Most 
ASEAN countries want to maintain the current framework of ASEAN Plus 
Three, in which China, Japan, and South Korea would join as annexations.
Finally, Han’s (2009) evaluation is worthy of quoting to understand the current 
state of East Asian regionalism:
The East Asian Summit, as it has turned out, is an addition to 
the ASEAN + 3 summit which was launched in 1997, neither 
a replacement nor evolution from it as originally envisaged. 
Furthermore, the old dilemma that has been dogging the pro-
moters of East Asian community still remains: How do we de-
fi ne its relationship with the Asia-Pacifi c regionalism, presum-
ably embodied in APEC, which holds its own summit meetings 
 annually?
Therefore, this paper concludes by saying that we need to develop a new con-
cept for a community, neither an expanded East Asia community nor an en-
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hanced form of ASEAN Plus Three. This new concept should be the Asia Eco-
nomic Community Forum, www.aecforum.net, where all Asian countries are 
participating. This can become the moving force to lead regional community 
building in Asia.
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